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How do banks react to increased interbank competition? Recent banking theory offers 
conflicting predictions about the impact of competition on bank orientation - i.e., the choice 
of relationship based versus transactional banking - and bank industry specialization. We 
empirically investigate the impact of interbank competition on bank branch orientation and 
specialization. We employ a unique data set containing detailed information on bank-firm 
relationships and industry classification. We find that bank branches facing stiff local 
competition engage relatively more in relationship-based lending but specialize somewhat 
less in a particular industry. Our results illustrate that competition and relationships are not 
necessarily inimical. 
JEL Classification: G21, L11, L14. 
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In their seminal paper {Petersen, 1995 #159} investigate the effects of competition between 
banks on the loan rate and the availability of bank credit.  Petersen and Rajan model how 
especially lower quality firms may be negatively affected by interbank competition.  Their 
reasoning is that banks are unwilling to invest in relationships by incurring initial loan 
losses that may never be recouped in the future (as firms can later on obtain a low loan rate 
in a competitive interbank market).
1  Petersen and Rajan document that young firms in 
more concentrated banking markets obtain more relationship benefits, i.e., lower loan rates 
and easier access to bank credit, than firms in more competitive banking markets. 
However, recent theoretical and empirical work is starting to question whether credit 
market competition is always “inimical to the formation of mutually beneficial 
relationships between firms and specific creditors” (p. 407).  {Boot, 2000 #315}, for 
example, revisit the presumed incompatibility between competition and relationship 
finance and argue that the source of competition matters in the determination of bank 
orientation (i.e., relationship-based versus transactional lending) and bank industry 
specialization.  In their model, capital market competition reduces the relative amount of 
relationship lending chosen by banks but interbank competition actually increases 
relationship lending.  Their reasoning is that banks when faced with stiffer interbank 
competition have greater incentives to offer relationship loans.  Relationship lending 
(compared to transactional lending) allows banks to shield rents more effectively, as 
relationship banking differentiates the lending bank better from competing banks.  Boot and 
Thakor reason that competition also affects the banks’ investment in sector expertise.  
Interbank competition reduces bank industry specialization as the marginal returns to sector 
specialization decline. 
Recent empirical work by {Elsas, 2003 #865} carefully studies the determinants of 
relationship lending.  Elsas employs a cross-sectional data set containing bank credit files 
on 122 large German firms to investigate the relationship between local bank market 
concentration and the likelihood a bank assesses itself to be the “Hausbank” of a firm.  His 
study complements the approach taken by {Petersen, 1995 #159}, who employ cross-
sectional data to infer smoothing of loan rates and availability of credit over the lifetime of 
their firms.  Elsas actually documents a mostly decreasing relationship between 
concentration and the incidence of the Hausbank status.  Hence his preliminary findings 
suggest relationship banking prevails in more competitive banking markets as hypothesized 
by {Boot, 2000 #315}. 
Our paper aims to contribute to this literature by analyzing a unique data set containing 
loans to 13,098 firms (mainly single-person businesses), comprising the entire loan 
portfolio of an important bank in Belgium.  This data set allows us to study how both local 
and national competition affect bank orientation and bank industry specialization.  We 
control for branch, regional and firm characteristics. 
We find, in line with {Boot, 2000 #315}, that when local interbank competition is fiercer a 
bank branch is more likely to engage a borrower in relationship banking and somewhat less 
likely to specialize in lending to a particular industry (unlike in Boot and Thakor, this is the 
case for both relationship and transactional borrowers).  In particular the presence (in the 
postal zone of the borrower) of many other banks with equal market shares or the presence 
of banks with multiple contacts across other postal zones results in more relationship 
lending and less industry specialization. 
We further document that borrowers located closer to the bank branch are more likely to be 
engaged as relationship borrowers. That is borrowers take other bank services and are serviced over a longer time period when close by.  In addition, closer-by borrowers are less 
likely to operate in an industry in which the branch specializes.  Finally, we find that larger 
bank branches lend substantially more on a transactional basis, a result suggestive of 
organizational size effects modeled by {Stein, 2002 #682}, but are less likely to be 
specialized in particular industries. 
We organize the rest of the paper as follows.  Section II reviews the theoretical predictions 
regarding interbank competition, bank orientation and bank industry specialization, and 
presents recent empirical findings.  Section III introduces the data and discusses the 
variables used in our paper.  Sections IV and V display and discuss the empirical results on 
bank orientation and industry specialization.  Section VI concludes. 
II. Theoretical Predictions and Recent Empirical Findings 
A. Interbank Competition and Bank Orientation 
Theory offers conflicting views on the relation between interbank competition and a bank’s 
willingness to engage in relationship lending (Figure 1 summarizes the predictions of the 
different theoretical models).  A first set of theories argues that competition and 
relationships are incompatible.  {Mayer, 1988 #138} is the first to apply this insight to 
banking competition and relationship formation.  Mayer hypothesizes that long-term 
relationships, allowing firms to intertemporally share risks with their banks, only arise if 
the flexibility of the borrowing firms to switch banks is limited.  Competition in the 
banking market undermines the ability of the firm to commit itself to the bank to guarantee 
future compensation for possible current losses.
2 
{Petersen, 1995 #159} model the impact of bank market power on the possibilities to 
intertemporally share risks.  Market power is exogenous in their framework and a 
monopolistic bank extracts the high future surplus generated by the firm by backloading 
interest payments.  A bank in a competitive (future) market does not have the same latitude 
to share surplus intertemporally and consequently the bank may be less willing to offer 
credit.  Especially lower quality firms may be negatively affected by competition, as banks 
are unwilling to incur losses that may never be repaid.  Hence, credit will be more widely 
available in banking markets where banks enjoy market power.
3 
 {Boot, 2000 #315} extensively revisit the presumed incompatibility between competition 
and the nature of relationship specific financing.  They argue that more interbank 
competition leads to more relationship lending.  Boot and Thakor distinguish between two 
sources of competition, i.e., capital market competition and interbank competition, and they 
allow banks to choose between relationship lending and transactional lending.  In their 
model capital market competition reduces relationship lending, while interbank competition 
actually increases the relative amount of relationship lending.  A bank offering a 
relationship loan augments a borrower’s success probability.  Relationship lending then 
allows extracting higher rents from the borrower.  Increased interbank competition pushes 
banks into offering more relationship lending, as this activity allows banks to shields rents 
better.
4 
Relationship lending is non-monotonically related to the degree of concentration in banking 
markets in {Dinç, 2000 #711}, {Anand, 2001 #866}, and {Yafeh, 2001 #704}.  {Dinç, 
2000 #711} focuses on the degree of competition and the bank’s incentive to keep its 
commitment to lend to a borrower when the borrower’s credit quality deteriorates.  In the 
absence of competition banks already earn rents in the arm’s length market, so the cost of a 




 ultimately decrease with the number of banks that already have a good reputation, making 
the reputation mechanism most effective with an intermediate number of banks. 
Establishing a relationship involves a specific sunk cost in {Anand, 2001 #866}.
5  
Corresponding the so-called “loose linkage” between relationships and services in their 
model, banks cannot charge their customers for these costs.  In addition the information 
gathered during relationships is non-excludable, as for example competing (transactional) 
banks could be shown relevant loan offers or could try to poach loan officers from the 
relationship bank.  Consequently, relationships only survive through implicit contracting 
between banks sustained by intertemporal threats of reverting to a competitive outcome.  In 
particular, relationships arise in their model when few banks with similar market shares can 
cooperate (resulting in an intermediate to high concentration). 
Finally, {Yafeh, 2001 #704} analyze intra-temporal competition between a bank offering 
both relationship and arm’s length loans and banks offering arm’s length loans only.  
Starting from exogenously imposed market frictions, they find that increased competition 
in the arm’s length market first increases relationship lending.  The non-monotonicity is a 
result of the surplus sharing between banks and firms.  Increased competition in the arm’s 
length market forces the bank to increase the share of the surplus that goes to firms seeking 
relationship loans, making investment in relationships ultimately less profitable. 
B. Interbank Competition and Bank Industry Specialization 
Theory also provides hypotheses concerning the relation between interbank competition 
and industry specialization.  For example, competition affects the banks’ investment in 
sector expertise and hence the “value” of bank-firm relationships in {Boot, 2000 #315}.  In 
their model interbank competition reduces bank industry specialization in relationship loans 
as on the margin the returns to sector specialization decline.  Hence, the value added of the 
relationship loan for the borrower also decreases. 
But in contrast to {Boot, 2000 #315}, more interbank competition leads to more bank 
specialization across both arm’s length and relationship loan categories in {Dell'Ariccia, 
2003 #868} and {Hauswald, 2003 #706}.
6  {Hauswald, 2003 #706} assume that the quality 
of the information signal deteriorates in the “informational distance” between bank and 
borrower.  The informational distance increases for example when the firm operates in one 
industry and the bank specializes in another.  Adverse selection problems faced by 
uninformed transactional banks exacerbate in distance and the incidence of relationship 
banking increases in “the vicinity” of the informed relationship bank.  Hence, an increase in 
the number of banks in {Hauswald, 2003 #706} may lead to both more relationship 
banking and more bank industry specialization. 
To conclude, how interbank competition affects bank orientation and bank industry 
specialization seems ultimately an empirical question, but we are unaware of any studies 
that have investigated both questions comprehensively. 





All empirical papers so far investigate the effects of either local or nationwide interbank 
competition on indirect measures of bank orientation (Figure 2 summarizes the main 
empirical findings).  In their seminal paper {Petersen, 1995 #159} investigate the effect of 
local interbank competition on the loan rate and the availability of bank credit for credit-
constrained (e.g., young or distressed) firms in the 1988 U.S. National Survey of Small 
Business Finance dataset.  They employ a Herfindahl – Hirschman Index (HHI) in the local 
market for deposits to measure concentration.  Petersen and Rajan find that young firms in more concentrated markets (HHI > 0.18) obtain lower loan rates and take more early (trade 
credit) payment discounts (i.e., have easier access to bank credit) than firms in more 
competitive banking markets.  Banks seemingly smooth loan rates in concentrated markets 
and as a result provide more financing, in line with the predictions of their theoretical 
model. 
Work by {Bergstresser, 2001 #911}, {Bergstresser, 2001 #912}, {Scott, 2001 #913}, 
{Zarutskie, 2003 #882} revisits the issue from different angles exploring other U.S. 
datasets.  These studies broadly confirm the original findings by {Petersen, 1995 #159}.
7  
An exception is a paper by {Black, 2002 #990}.  They investigate the rate of new business 
incorporations across U.S. states.  They find that deregulation of branching restrictions 
positively affects new incorporations and that deregulation reduces the negative effect of 
concentration on new incorporations.  They also find that the share of small banks 
decreases business formation.
8 
Recent papers by {Fischer, 2000 #617} and {Elsas, 2003 #865} take a different approach in 
investigating the competition – bank orientation correspondence in Germany.  {Fischer, 
2000 #617} focuses on the transfer of information and the availability of credit and finds 
that both are higher in more concentrated markets.  {Elsas, 2003 #865} studies the 
determinants of relationship lending directly.  His results are very interesting.  He 
documents a non-monotonic relationship between local bank market concentration and the 
probability a bank is listed as a “Hausbank”.  In particular, he finds that the incidence of 
Hausbank status is actually the lowest for an intermediate range of market concentration 
with an HHI of around 0.2, though he notes that most observations of the HHI are also in 
that low range.  Nevertheless his findings seem to suggest the presence of more relationship 
banking in more competitive markets as in hypothesized by {Boot, 2000 #315}. 
Other papers study the effect of nationwide competition on commitment and relationship 
banking.  {Farinha, 2002 #567}, for example, study the switching from single to multiple 
bank relationships by new Portuguese firms.  They find that the arrival of new banks, 
potentially leading to less concentrated and more competitive banking markets, increases 
switching rates.  There are also cross-country studies.  {Steinherr, 1994 #869}, for 
example, document a negative correspondence between the share of foreign banks and 
equity investment by banks in 18 countries, {Cetorelli, 2001 #606} find that industries that 
rely heavily on external finance grow faster in countries with more concentrated banking 
systems (than those in countries with competitive systems), while {Ongena, 2000 #376} 
highlight the positive effect of concentration of the national banking markets on the 
incidence of single bank relationships.  The latter two studies measure concentration by 
calculating the percentage assets by the largest three commercial banks. 
To conclude, many empirical papers have investigated the effects of either local or 
nationwide interbank competition on indirect measures of bank orientation.  However none 
of the aforementioned papers employs direct measures of bank orientation (with the 
exception of {Elsas, 2003 #865}), controls for both local and nation-wide competition 
jointly, and/or studies the effects of interbank competition on bank industry specialization. 
III. Data and Variables 
A. Data 
The unique data set we analyze consists of loans granted to 13,098 firms by an important 
Belgian bank that operates all over Belgium.
9  The sample includes all existing loans at the 




 Characteristics of both the bank and the Belgian financial landscape make this data ideally 
suited to investigate the effect of local and nation-wide interbank competition on bank 
orientation and bank industry specialization.  The bank is one of a handful of truly national 
and general-purpose banks operating in Belgium in 1997.  As such the bank lends to firms 
located in most postal zones
10 and is active in 50 different industries (according to a two-
digit NACE classification).
11  Around 83% of the firms in its portfolio are single-person 
businesses and most borrowers obtain just one, relatively small, loan from this bank.  For 
each borrower we take the characteristics at the time of the first contract observed in the 
bank’s loan portfolio. 
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the 13,098 fully identifiable borrowers.  Table 1 
shows the definition, mean, minimum, maximum and standard deviation of our variables, 
broken down into six sets of characteristics: (1) dependent variables measuring bank 
orientation and bank industry specialization, (2) competition measures, (3) the bank branch 
characteristic, (4) postal zone variables, (5) firm size and legal form dummies, and (6) other 
firm characteristics.  We turn to each of these variables in the next subsections. 
B. Dependent Variables Measuring Bank Orientation and Industry Specialization 
Our main dependent variable measuring bank orientation reflects both the scope and the 
duration of the engagement between bank and borrower.  {Boot, 2000 #546} and {Ongena, 
2000 #460} argue that both scope and duration characterize relationship banking.  We 
define a dummy Relationship Banking to equal one if the bank considers itself as the Main 
Bank and if the length of the relationship with the borrower exceeds one year, and to equal 
zero otherwise. 
Main Bank captures the scope of the relationship and indicates whether this bank considers 
itself as the main-bank of the firm or not.  The definition used by the bank to determine 
whether it is the main-bank is the firm is “having a monthly ‘turnover’ on the current 
account of at least BEF 100,000 (€ 2,500),
12 
13 and is buying at least two products from the 
bank.”  Only 54% of all borrowers are classified as Main Bank customers.  In addition, {de 
Bodt, 2001 #739}, for example, document that even small Belgian firms employ multiple 
banks.  Consequently our Main Bank variable seemingly captures variation beyond the 
mere mechanical outcome of the firms’ choices for single bank relationships. 
A relationship starts when a firm buys for the first time a product from that bank.  The 
average duration of the relationship in the sample is around eight years.  Duration proxies 
for the increased time for a firm to experience the banks’ products and to appreciate the 
added flexibility the bank has to maintain and fulfill implicit contracts.  While the bank 
gains private information about a firm to tailor its products, the firm may also become 
locked-in (for example, {Boot, 1994 #246}, {Sharpe, 1990 #175}, and {Rajan, 1992 
#163}). 
We find justification for using a duration cut-off of only one year in {Angelini, 1998 #385} 
and {Cole, 1998 #318} who document that credit availability does not increase much 
beyond the first years of a relationship (we replace one year by three years in robustness 
exercises).  We also note that the repayment duration of more than 60% of the observed 
loans is shorter than or equal to one year.  Hence it seems likely that for the majority of the 
borrowers rollovers of loans take place within the first year of the relationship. 
We frame the dependent variable as a dummy variable because theory suggests a 
dichotomy between relationship and transactional lending.  However we will employ Main 
Bank and the duration of the relationship separately as dependent variables in robust 




 Additional advantages of our dummy approach are that: (1) given our definition about half 
the firms are engaged as relationship borrowers (i.e., the mean of our independent variable 
is close to 50%); (2) the reported partial derivatives allow for a straightforward percentage 
interpretation; and (3) comparison with results in other papers, in particular {Elsas, 2003 
#865}, is possible. 
We also construct a dependent variable measuring bank industry specialization.  For every 
borrower we know which specific bank branch granted the loan.  We classify the borrowers 
in the 50 two-digit NACE code classes and for each branch calculate a variable Industry 
Specialization as the proportion of loans of the bank branch loan portfolio in the same 
industry as the borrower.  Notice that this measure puts more weight on high degrees of 
industry specialization and on large branches (in both cases, there are more borrowers in 
the sample), possibly introducing a bias against picking up an effect of competition on bank 
industry specialization. 
C. Herfindahl – Hirschman Index of Market Concentration 
As of December 31
st, 1994, we identify 7,477 branches,
14 operated by 145 different banks 
and located in 837 different postal zones.  Each postal zone carries a postal code between 
1,000 and 9,999 (the first digit in the code indicates a geographical region, which we call 
“postal area” and which in most cases coincides with one of the ten Provinces in Belgium).  
A postal zone covers on average 26 sq km,
15 and contains approximately six bank branches.  
A postal area covers 3,359 sq km on average.  Not surprisingly borrowers are often located 
in more densely banked areas, with on average more than 17 bank branches per postal zone, 
resulting in around 250,000 possible borrower – bank branch pairs. 
Previous research has argued that the relevant loan market is local in nature for small 
businesses.
16  Branch proximity continues to play an important role in determining bank 
choice by borrowers in Europe.  For example, results reported in {Degryse, 2003 #827} 
show that loan rates in Belgium are not uniform across borrowers or across branches.  In 
addition, physical distance between borrower and local financier affects loan conditions.  
We therefore a priori select each postal zone as the relevant market.
17  The median 
borrower in our sample is located less than 2.5 kilometers from the lending bank branch, 
and this distance seemingly hasn’t increased by much over the last few decades.
18 
However firms are also influenced by other branch (convenience and hours of operation), 
bank (reputation, quality and reliability) and relationship (personal or long-term) 
characteristics when choosing a particular bank branch ({Elliehausen, 1990 #70}; {Binks, 
1997 #786}).  For example, the lending bank is located closer than the closest competitor in 
44% of the borrower contract cases in the sample, making distance the dominant bank 
(product) characteristic for only a sizeable minority of the borrowers in Belgium. 
Our main measure of competition is the Herfindahl – Hirschman Index (HHI).  This 
variable is widely used as a measure of concentration in the literature and is defined as the 
summed squares of bank market shares by the number of branches in each postal zone.
19  
For postal zones without bank branches we set the HHI equal to one to facilitate 
decomposing the concentration index later in the paper (by corollary the Number of Banks, 
another competition variable introduced shortly, is also set equal to one).  However, as a 
robustness check, we remove branchless postal zones in part of the exercises. 
We also employ the total Number of Branches and the Number of Banks in each postal 
zone.  The former measure assumes no coordination can occur between the branches of the 
same bank, while the latter measure presupposes coordination effectively takes place.  We 




 Inversion also facilitates the interpretation of the estimated coefficients and comparisons 
across the competition variables, in particular with the HHI measure.  Both transformed 
Number measures are bound between zero and one, with zero indicating no market 
concentration and one indicating maximum concentration.  As some borrowers reside in 
postal zones without bank branches (i.e., the lending bank branch is located in another, 
possibly adjacent, postal zone), we add one to the Number of Branches before inverting. 
D. Multi-Market Contact 
The postal zone is our a priori chosen banking market.  However, many banks are 
operating in more than one postal zone and may compete with other multi-location banks 
across zones ({Barros, 1999 #859} or {Park, 2003 #984}).  On the other hand, the banking 
product may be differentiated more by location than the postal zone delineation implies.  
To control for the factors at play in these “upstream” and “downstream” arenas, we 
introduce additional variables. 
Banks may meet and compete across many postal zones.  {Edwards, 1955 #985} 
introduced the “linked oligopoly” hypothesis that predicts cross-market contacts among 
banks to increase the incentives for banks to collude.  The hypothesis implies that banks 
should compete less when geographical market-overlap increases.  Multi-market contact 
may facilitate anti-competitive “mutual forbearance”, as the punishment for deviation from 
collusion becomes large ({Heggestad, 1978 #873}, {Bernheim, 1990 #914}),
20 and 
coordination between banks may then foster relationship banking as in {Anand, 2001 
#866}. 
However, other theoretical work points towards a possible pro-competitive effect of multi-
market contact ({Scott, 1982 #986}).  {Mester, 1987 #872}, for example, presents a model 
in which banks have incomplete information about their rivals’ marginal costs.  As a result 
banks claim to have low marginal costs to sway competitors to produce less.  If costs are 
imperfectly correlated across markets, multi-market banks have an incentive to put larger 
quantities on the market than the profit-maximizing level.  “In markets with high 
concentration, control is in the hands of a few banks. Thus incentives for these [banks] to 
mislead other [banks] are greater since they stand to gain more” (p. 540).  Similarly, but in 
a different setting, {Park, 2003 #984} show that the presence of large multi-market banks 
promotes local competition, in particular in highly concentrated markets. 
We construct a Multi-Market Contact measure as proposed in {Evans, 1994 #871}.
21  The 
variable can be defined succinctly as the sum of all bank pairs in the borrower’s postal zone 
weighted by the relative frequency of their bilateral contacts in other postal zones.  The 
variable ranges between zero (banks in the postal zone have no contact elsewhere) and one 
(all banks in the zone have contact with all other banks across all other postal zones). 
E. Distance Variables 
Competition across postal zones may determine the prevalence of relationship banking, but 
the same is true for more local, “spatial” competition.  Transportation costs, for example, 
for either borrower ({Hotelling, 1929 #639}; {Salop, 1979 #640}) or lender ({Sussman, 
1995 #634}) may determine the degree of competition for the borrower.  In standard spatial 
models, borrowers always select the closest bank and competition is fiercest for the median 
borrower.  However, borrowers seek only one bank product and engage a lender only once 






However in extended spatial models firms in need of multiple bank products, for example, may still engage a single bank, most likely the closest one, to minimize transportation costs 
(see, for example, {Armstrong, 2001 #915}).  Consequently firms close to the lender may 
opt for “relationship banking” (in scope) on the basis of transportation costs.  Alternatively, 
in {Dell'Ariccia, 2001 #516} borrowers can switch, but the “close” borrowers are more 
likely to stay than the borrowers located far away from their lender.  Again, close 
borrowers are destined to be “relationship borrowers” (now in duration).  In addition, this 
effect may strengthen ({Hauswald, 2003 #706}) if the number of local banks increases. 
We calculate the distance between the borrower and both the lending bank and the branches 
of all other, competing banks located in the same postal zone as the borrower.  We employ 
both web-based MapBlast.com and PC-based MS Mappoint to track the shortest traveling 
time (in minutes) by car between the borrower and each bank branch ({Degryse, 2003 
#827} provide details).  Address recording errors, incomplete map coverage, changes in 
street names and borrower relocation cut in our sample.  We further conservatively remove 
the 1-% borrowers located farthest from their lending bank and drop borrowers located in 
postal zones without competing banks.  We end up with Distance to Lender and Distance 
to Closest Competitors measures for 11,222 borrowers (we call this reduced sample the 
“Distance sample”).
22 
We transform both measures to (1 + Distance to Lender)
-1 and [1 – (1+Distance to Closest 
Competitors)
-1], respectively.  Again, both transformations account at once for the possibly 
decreasing effects of distance and force the variables to run from zero (“competitive”) to 
one (“not competitive”).  For example, if both distance measures equal one, the borrower is 
located close to the observed lender but really far from a competing bank.  Conditioning on 
the fact that we observe the close lender granting the loan, we expect, as in a multi-product 
problem or as in {Dell'Ariccia, 2001 #516}, that the engagement is more likely to be 
relationship-based.  On the other hand, if both distance measures equal zero, the borrower 
is located far from the observed lender but really close to a competing bank.  Conditioning 
on the fact that we observe a far-away lender granting the loan, we can expect the 
engagement to be transactional. 
F. Control Variables 
We introduce bank branch size, postal zone variables, and firm size, legal form and 
industry dummies in the base regressions.  We include additional firm characteristics in 
robustness exercises. 
Start with the variable Branch Size.  {Berger, 1999 #842} argue that organizational 
diseconomies (of engaging in different type of lending activities) may prevent large banks 
from efficiently providing both transaction-based lending to large corporations and 
relationship-based lending to small businesses.  {Stein, 2002 #682} models their intuition 
and distinguishes between “hard” and “soft” information to show that large hierarchical 
banks perform better when information can be “hardened” without incurring a cost and 
passed along inside the bank.  Only loan officers at small banks on the other hand may have 
the proper incentives to collect and employ soft information, thereby encouraging 
relationship banking.  {Berger, 2002 #677} provide suggestive evidence corroborating 
elements of Stein’s model.  They find, for example, that large banks have less exclusive 
and shorter relationships and interact more impersonally with their borrowers.  {Liberti, 
2002 #828} documents how delegation increases monitoring efforts by relationship 
managers. 
We conjecture that Stein’s arguments may also apply when comparing branches of one 




 large branches may then be less willing to engage in the collection of soft information and 
relationship lending may suffer.  Consequently, we include Branch Size to control for 
possible size differences across branches of the same bank.  In effect, we pursue an even 
more stringent test of some of the size implications of Stein’s model as all branches belong 
to the same bank, allowing us to control for bank heterogeneity.  We measure Branch Size 
by the proportion of the business loan portfolio (in number of borrowers) at the bank 
branch.  There are substantial differences in Branch Size across the bank.  The smallest 
branch engages only 0.006% or 74 of the 13,098 borrowers, while the largest branch 
services 0.905% or 1,186 of the bank’s borrowers. 
To control for regional variation in corporate demand for banking services, we introduce a 
set of postal zone variables that also includes eight Postal Area Dummies.  The variable 
Number of Firms measures the number of registered firms in the borrower’s postal zone, 
while the variable Assets of Firms averages the amount of assets of registered firms in the 
borrower’s postal zone.  Both variables are constructed using Belfirst.  We use the database 
containing end-of-1994 information on 176,382 Belgian firms.  We similarly compile 
Industry Concentration to measure the proportion of registered firms in the borrower’s 
postal zone in the industry of the borrower.  The latter variable captures the probability that 
another (random) firm in the borrower’s postal zone operates in the same industry as the 
observed borrower.  Finally, we introduce a dummy variable Urban to control for general 
differences between businesses located in rural and urban communities.  Urban may further 
capture heterogeneity in information available to banks.  For example, banks in urban areas 
may rely more on hard information while rural banks may collect more soft information 
({Klein, 1992 #987}).  Urban equals one when the borrower is located in an agglomeration 
with more than 250,000 inhabitants,
23 and zero otherwise. 
To control for firm characteristics, we include two firm size,
24 four legal form and as many 
as 49 industry dummies (in addition to the base case).  We can distinguish between Single-
Person Businesses (82.8% of the sample), Small (16.0%), and Medium and Large (1.6%) 
Firms; and between Sole Proprietorships (82.1%), Limited Partnerships (12.1%), Limited 
Partnerships with Equal Sharing (1.0%), Corporations (3.9%), and Temporary 
Arrangements (0.9%).  In the regressions, we exclude the dummies for Single-Person 
Businesses and Sole Proprietorships. 
To control further for firm characteristics we also focus on the 9,213 (70.3%) of the 
borrowers that are both Single-Person Business and Sole Proprietorship (this reduced 
sample we call the “SPB & SP sample”), collect Age for 1,991 firms (the “Age sample”), 
and glean Assets, Earnings / Assets, and Short-Term Debt / Assets from Belfirst for 645 
firms (the “Augmented sample”).  We will employ each of these samples in robustness 
exercises.  We display some key sample statistics in Table 2. 
IV. Empirical Results on Bank Orientation 
We now discuss the regressions of our bank orientation and industry specialization 
measures on the competition and control variables.  The correlations displayed in Table 3 
between the main dependent and the discussed competition variables already indicate the 
direction of some of our results. 
In this section we analyze the regressions of the dependent variable(s) measuring bank 
orientation on the set of competition and control variables.  We start discussing the effects 
of the competition variables and return to a discussion of all the control variables at the end 
of the section.  We first discuss the results for the dependent variable Relationship Banking 




 robustness checks. 
A. Postal Zone Competition and Relationship Banking 
Since the Relationship Banking is a binary dependent variable, we employ a Probit 
model.
25  In Table 4 we report the partial derivatives, in percent, at the means and 
significance levels based on t-ratios for the coefficients.  To conserve space we neither 
display partial derivatives for most of the control variables nor the standard errors. 
In Model I we start with the commonly used (and previously detailed) measure of market 
concentration, i.e., the Herfindahl – Hirschman Index (HHI).  The coefficient on this 
measure is statistically insignificant and economically small.  For example, an increase of 
0.1 in the HHI, say from a competitive (HHI < 0.10) to a “highly concentrated” (HHI > 
0.18) market,
26 would only increase the probability of Relationship Banking by around 
0.3%. 
We replace HHI by respectively (1 + Number of Branches)
-1, (1 + Number of Adjacent 
Branches)
-1, or (Number of Banks)
-1, but none of the coefficients is statistically significant 
or economically relevant (we chose not to tabulate the results). 
In Model II we add HHI
2 to capture the non-monotonicity present in for example {Dinç, 
2000 #711}, {Anand, 2001 #866}, or {Yafeh, 2001 #704}.  Both coefficients are 
statistically significant, though in sign opposite to the non-monotonicity predictions, and 
economically modest but relevant.  An increase in the HHI from 0.10 to 0.18 for example 
decreases the probability of Relationship Banking by around 1.5%, while an increase from 
0.05 to 0.50 decreases the probability by close to 5%.  Replacing HHI and HHI
2 by a set of 
dummies that equal one if HHI is situated in a certain range and are zero otherwise yields 
similar results.  Adding squared terms to the specifications featuring (1 + Number of 
Branches)
-1, (1 + Number of Adjacent Branches)
-1, or (Number of Banks)
-1 yield 
statistically insignificant and economically irrelevant results. 
The regressions so far left two possibly important arenas of competition unaccounted for.  
First, banks may take into account exactly whom their competitors are in the postal zone 
given contact in other postal zones, i.e., banks may care about Multi-Market Contact.  
Second, as argued above, proximity may encourage firms to frequent the same bank for 
multiple services during a longer time period. 
To control for either pro- or anti-competitive effects arising from Multi-Market Contact, we 
introduce the contact variable in Model III.  To control for spatial effects, we add the two 
distance measures in Model IV.  Removing Multi-Market Contact in Model IV does not 
alter the results and we center our discussion on Model IV (even though it is employing a 
somewhat smaller sample). 
The coefficients on both HHI variables remain significant and actually become 
substantially larger in Model IV.  Figure 3 displays the resulting schedule (at the means of 
the other variables).  The percentage probability of observing Relationship Banking is 
measured along the vertical axis, while HHI is on the horizontal axis.  The scale on the 
horizontal axis is proportionate to the number of observations with particular values for 
HHI.  Increasing HHI from 0.10 to 0.18, indicated by vertical lines in the Figure, decreases 
Relationship Banking by 3.1% (from 55.0 to 51.9) while increasing the HHI from 0.06 to 
0.50 decreases the probability by almost 10%. 
These results confirm a key result in {Boot, 2000 #315} but are at odds with either 
{Petersen, 1995 #159} or the non-monotonicity predictions in {Dinç, 2000 #711}, {Anand, 
2001 #866}, or {Yafeh, 2001 #704}).  Branches seemingly engage in more relationship 




 The substantial increase in Relationship Banking for HHI values close and equal to one 
requires further exploration.  Replacing HHI and HHI
2 by a set of dummies that equal one 
if HHI is situated in a certain range and are zero otherwise (to partly neutralize the effects 
of these observations) yields qualitatively similar results.  Similarly, removing observations 
for which HHI=1 (HHI > 0.9) and dropping HHI
2 yields a partial derivative equal to –
20.5** (27.3***) on HHI, still statistically significant and economically relevant. 
If Relationship Banking decreases with concentration in less concentrated markets, why 
then do we observe more relationship banking in very concentrated markets?  Physical 
proximity, as pointed out earlier, may compel a firm to frequent a close-by bank for all its 
needs.  A monopolist in a postal zone may simply provide all services, in particular when 
banks in other postal zones are far away.  An increase in Relationship Banking for high 
HHI values then merely affirms our a-priori choice of the postal zone as the relevant 
geographical market.  Alternatively, we note that {Boot, 2000 #315} predict that a 
monopoly bank should engage in little or no Relationship Banking.  However, the 
monopolist bank may become an industry specialist by default (by servicing all firms in the 
vicinity) and hence take on relationship banking nevertheless.  This is not modeled in Boot 
and Thakor, as in their model even a monopolist incurs specialization costs (that are not a 
function of market structure in their model). 
At this point we also note that our findings regarding the HHI – Relationship Banking 
correspondence are qualitatively similar to the (somewhat stronger) non-monotonicity 
documented in {Elsas, 2003 #865}.  In his paper the incidence of the Hausbank status 
drops from 80% to 40% as HHI increases from zero to 0.2, and then sharply increases to 
100% for an HHI equal to 0.45.  We conjecture that the differences in firm size and the 
corresponding number of bank engagements between his and our sample are responsible 
for this result.
27  The 11,222 firms in our “distance” sample are much smaller than the 122 
firms in his sample;
28 hence our firms are possibly more opaque and may seek to engage 
fewer – sometimes one – banks to satisfy their credit needs.
29  As a result, an increase in the 
number of banks on the market may result in a smaller increase in the degree of 
competition for the firms in our sample than for the large firms in {Elsas, 2003 #865} that 
had engaged many (all) banks in the local market already. 
B. Multi-Market Contact 
Next we focus on the coefficient of Multi-Market Contact in Model IV.  Multi-Market 
Contact carries a positive sign, is statistically significant, and economically relevant.  An 
increase in the variable from 0 to 0.33 (the observed range) increases the probability of 
observing Relationship Banking by almost 10%.  However, removing both HHI variables 
causes the coefficient on Multi-Market Contact to become insignificant, possibly indicating 
the need to control for market concentration and multi-market contact simultaneously.  The 
contact variable is significantly and negatively correlated with HHI (see Table 3), and this 
is partly by construction.  Indeed, an increase in the number of banks in a postal zone 
increases the likelihood that some bank pairs also meet in another postal zone hereby 
increasing Multi-Market Contact.  However, an increase in the number of banks also 
decreases market concentration as measured by HHI. 
Multi-Market Contact between banks across postal zones stimulates Relationship Banking.  
Hence, the contact variable possibly captures a pro-competitive effect if this variable would 
cut in the same direction as HHI.  However, to shed further light on this issue we first 
examine more closely what occurs at the postal zone level (following {Anand, 2001 #866}) 




 and {Park, 2003 #984}). 
Recall that in {Anand, 2001 #866} only coordination between a few banks with equal 
market shares fosters relationship banking.  To test whether the effect of concentration on 
Relationship Banking arises through a decrease in the number of banks or through the 
inequality of bank market shares, we decompose HHI in (Number of Banks)
-1 and [HHI – 
(Number of Banks)
-1].  Column 1 in Table 5 reports the splits for the Base Model.  The 
results are remarkable and suggest that it is only the change in the number of banks, and not 
the change in their market shares, that is driving our results (though admittedly our measure 
based on the number of bank branches is rather coarse when measuring market shares).  An 
increase in the number of banks from 3 to 37 increases the probability of Relationship 
Banking by 8.5% (from 40.9 to 49.4%).  Consequently the observed lender seemingly 
doesn’t coordinate with other banks at the local level in offering relationship banking. 
Alternatively we decompose HHI in (Branch Share of the Lender)
2 and [HHI – (Branch 
Share of the Lender)
2] to check for possible coordination between branches of the lender.  
And indeed, a variety of specifications suggest that a larger relative presence of the lender 
increases Relationship Banking at about the same rate as the relative presence of other 
lenders decreases it, though the coefficients are not always statistically significant.  Taken 
together these results suggest that within one postal zone, branches of the lending bank may 
coordinate among themselves but not with the branches of the other banks present there. 
Now, given the local discretion in setting loan conditions (an assessment that is based on 
formal interviews and loan rate variation), it would be surprising if the bank would succeed 
in coordinating with other banks at the national level to achieve relationship orientation at 
the local level.  However to test for the occurrence of national coordination (versus a pro-
competitive effect) more directly, we also interact HHI and HHI
2 with Multi-Market 
Contact.  {Mester, 1987 #872}, for example, argues that if the Contact variable measures 
“mutual forbearance” then the Contact variable itself should have the same sign as HHI (a 
result we did not have so far) while the interaction terms should equal zero. 
Column 2 in Table 5 tabulates the coefficients.  Results are somewhat mixed.  The size and 
also the sign of the coefficients on the interaction terms suggest no coordination takes 
place, but multicollinearity seemingly robs the coefficients of their significance.  The 
coefficient on the Multi-Market Contact variable is still positive and opposite the 
coefficient on HHI but much smaller than in earlier specifications. 
C. Distance Measures 
Now we return to the distance measures in Model IV.  The coefficient on Distance to 
Lender is positive, statistically significant, and economically relevant, confirming either a 
multi-product or switching hypothesis (as in {Dell'Ariccia, 2001 #516}).  The probability 
of observing Relationship Banking for a borrower close to the Lender (i.e., (1 + Distance to 
Lender)
-1 = 1) is more than 11% higher than for a far-away borrower (i.e., (1 + Distance to 
Lender)
-1 = 0).  On the other hand, Distance to Closest Competitor is not statistically 
significant. 
These results are unaffected if we remove either one of the two HHI and/or Multi-Market 
Contact variables.  Similarly, removing both distance variables in Model IV leaves the 
other coefficients unaffected.  Motivated by {Hauswald, 2003 #706} we further interact 
HHI and/or HHI
2 with our distance measures.  The coefficients on HHI and HHI
2 remain 
broadly the same in sign and magnitude, but are no longer significant.  The interaction 
terms are insignificant as well.  We suspect collinearity problems. 




 closest bank competitor (we call these firms the “relatively close” firms) and those firms 
that are closer to the closest bank competitor than to the lender (the “relatively far” firms).  
The coefficients on our competition measures in both subsamples retain the same sign, 
significance, and magnitude.  The distance measures are only significant for the firms that 
are “relatively far”.  Taken together, these results suggest the distance variables may proxy 
for other factors (transportation costs?) than those picked up by our measures of postal zone 
and national competition. 
To conclude, the observed lender engages more borrowers in relationship banking if many 
other banks (with equal market shares) operate in the same postal zone or if the banks in 
the postal zone have multiple contacts across other postal zones.  Coordination between 
banks does not seem to play a role in or across postal zones, such that the observed lender 
may turn to protecting rents by engaging in relationship lending as in {Boot, 2000 #315}.  
More relationship banking is also being observed when firms are located close to the bank. 
D. Robustness Checks 
1. Subsample of Single-Person Businesses and Sole Proprietorships 
Model V in Table 4 focuses on the 9,213 firms that are both Single-Person Businesses 
(SPB) and Sole Proprietorships (SP).  There are a number of reasons to believe that the 
possible correspondence between competition and bank orientation may appear sharpest in 
this subsample.  First, remember that we are looking at the loan portfolio of one single bank 
and that we now retain just one type of firm.  Consequentially, important bank and firm 
characteristics potentially clouding our previous results are controlled for.  Second, Single-
Person Businesses / Sole Proprietorships are the smallest (possibly most opaque and locally 
restricted) firms that are affected most by the “structure of the local banking market”. 
The findings in Model V basically confirm our earlier results.  The non-monotonicity in 
HHI is again economically relevant.  For example, increasing HHI from zero to 0.4 
decreases the probability of Relationship Banking by almost 15%, from 60 to 45%.  We 
again replace HHI and HHI
2 by range dummies and confirm these findings. 
2. Additional Independent Variables and Branch Effects 
Models VI and VII in Table 4 add Age and other firm characteristics (Assets, Earnings / 
Assets, Short-Term Debt /Assets) to the specification.  The main results go through almost 
unaffected, even though the samples are substantially reduced and quite different in their 
composition (for example, the Distance sample contains 16% small and 1% medium and 
large firms, the Age sample 89% small and 5% medium/large, and the Augmented sample 
87% and 8%). 
We further add Multi-Market Contact
2 to Model III and all possible combinations of Multi-
Market Contact
2, (1 + Distance to Lender)
-2, [1 – (1 + Distance to Closest Competitors)
-1]
2 
to specifications IV to VII.  Admittedly we know of little theoretical justification for doing 
so (hence we choose not to tabulate the results).  However, the coefficients of HHI, HHI
2, 
Multi-Market Contact, and (1 + Distance to Lender)
-1 are virtually unaffected in 
significance, sign and size in all specifications and only the coefficient on the newly added 
(1 + Distance to Lender)






We further replace Branch Size by random branch effects,
30 remove Industry Dummies (to 
avoid collinearity problems), and employ OLS to re-estimate the main specifications.  
Results are unaffected, if anything are even more “striking” in statistical significance and 
economic relevance. 3. Alternative Definitions of the Dependent Variable 
As the duration cutoff of one year in the construction of the dependent variable 
Relationship Banking was somewhat arbitrarily chosen (remember that results in 
{Angelini, 1998 #385} and {Cole, 1998 #318} suggested a short duration cutoff), we also 
run all specifications with a three-year cut-off.  Results are virtually unaffected. 
Next we employ our two other variables capturing bank orientation, i.e., Main Bank and 
Duration.  {Elsas, 2003 #865}, for example, argues that duration may be a poor proxy for 
the intensity of the relationship.  We report the almost unaffected results in Appendix Table 
A1.  We also estimate a Tobit model (censored at zero) with ln(Duration of Relationship) 
as the dependent variable and report the results in Table A2.  Again the results are very 
similar to the ones reported above, seemingly contradicting the claim of non-relevance of 
duration as a measure of relationship intensity by {Elsas, 2003 #865}.  We again conjecture 
that the differences in firm size and the corresponding number of bank relationships 
between his and our sample are responsible for this result.  The firms in our sample are 
much smaller and may have fewer bank relationships.  As a result, for the firms in our 
sample the observed duration of a relationship may capture or at least be correlated with 
relationship intensity. 
4. Omitted Factors 
We are further concerned that duration is affected by factors that also caused current 
market concentration.  For example, the presence of many high-quality firms in the postal 
zone 20 years ago may have lead to the initial engagement between lender and firms and 
may also have contributed to the longevity of the observed relationships (as both 
relationships and firms survived).  But circumstances in the postal zone 20 years ago may 
also have attracted other banks to set up branches there in the period since then.  To deal 
with this pernicious problem we toss out all observations with durations exceeding 10 (7) 
years and rerun most specifications.  Even though we loose more than one third (one half) 
of the sample, the competition results are almost unaffected. 
E. Control Variables 
Finally, we return to the coefficients on the control variables, starting with Branch Size.  
We reported the coefficient on Branch Size in all Tables discussed so far.  The coefficient 
is almost always significant at a 1% level and economically quite relevant.  The partial 
derivative at the means for both Relationship Banking and Main Bank varies around -14, 
indicating that an increase from the smallest to the largest branch (0.006 to 0.905) 
decreases the incidence of relationship banking by around 13%.  The partials in the 
Duration Tobit models (Table A2) suggest an equivalent decrease by around 3 years in the 
length of the observed relationship for a similar increase in branch size.  Hence, ceteris 
paribus, larger bank branches pursue more transactional banking. 
{Berger, 2002 #677} document that larger banks have less exclusive and shorter 
relationships than smaller banks.  To make our results better comparable to theirs, we 
replace Branch Size by ln(Branch Loan Volume) defined as the natural logarithm of the 
loan portfolio of the branch in 1000s of US$ (they employ the log of bank assets).  We 
estimate logit and OLS models with Relationship Banking and ln(1 + Duration of 
Relationship) as the dependent variables and report the results in the Appendix Table A3.  
For easy comparison we also tabulate their results (in the shaded columns).  The resulting 
coefficients are comparable in magnitude, in particular for duration as the dependent 




 lender) differs somewhat from our Relationship Banking variable. 
Coefficients on the other control variables are reported in Table A4 in the Appendix.  We 
report the representative coefficients from Model IV, VI, and VIII.  None of the four postal 
zone coefficients are consistent in sign, size, or statistical significance.  The legal form 
dummies in Model IV are highly significant.  Banks engage Sole Proprietorships less likely 
in a Relationship and more profitable firms more likely, possibly because of bankruptcy 
risks.  As such the specifications highlights the need to control carefully for firm 
characteristics, as we do in Models V to VII. 
V. Empirical Results on Bank Industry Specialization 
Next we analyze the regressions of the dependent variable(s) measuring bank industry 
specialization on the same set of competition and control variables. 
A. Competition and Industry Specialization 
We employ ordinary least squares.  The dependent variable, Industry Specialization, is by 
construction always larger than zero, but it is censored at 100.  However, as the variable is 
equal to 100 for only 19 borrowers we disregard this minor censoring issue.  We follow the 
same line-up of exercises as for bank orientation and report the results in Table 6.  Overall 
our results indicate that market concentration is not economically relevant in explaining 
industry specialization. 
We start by focusing on the full sample.  In Model I in Table 6, we introduce HHI as the 
measure for concentration.  The coefficient turns out to be both statistically and 
economically insignificant.  Theory suggests potential non-monotonicity; hence, we 
incorporate HHI
2 in Model II.  The results remain insignificant providing no evidence in 
favour of banks specializing in an industry when competition is low ({Dell'Ariccia, 2003 
#868}) or intermediate ({Boot, 2000 #315}).  Model III in Table 6 incorporates the Multi-
Market Contact variable.  If more contact implies a pro-competitive effect, {Boot, 2000 
#315} hypothesize less industry specialization should be observed, whereas according to 
{Dell'Ariccia, 2003 #868} more industry specialization should be observed.  Our empirical 
results are in line with the former suggesting that more competition leads to more 
specialization.  But the effects seem rather modest.  For example, an increase in the contact 
variable from 0 to 0.33 (minimum to maximum) decreases Industry Specialization by 
around 3% (Industry Specialization has a mean of 18.2%). 
We again arrive at our Base Model (IV) by incorporating the two distance measures.  
Distance to Lender is again statistically significant, but only at a 10% level, and negative.  
The higher the Distance to Lender, the more specialization we observe.  But the effects also 
seem modest.  Industry Specialization for a far away borrower is only 1.4% higher than for 
a borrower close to the bank branch.  Distance to Closest Competitors is not significant. 
The Base Model also suggests a concave relationship between HHI and specialization, but 
the coefficients are seemingly small.  Figure 4 plots the resulting schedule (at the means of 
the other variables) using a similar setup as in Figure 3.  An increase in HHI from 0.10 to 
0.18 (the vertical lines marking the regions with varying degree of competition), for 
example, increases industry specialization by only 0.4% (from 17.8 to 18.3%).  Figure 4 
broadly confirms that competition reduces industry specialization at the branch level, but 
also suggests small economic relevance. 
To conclude, the branches of the analyzed bank engage somewhat fewer borrowers in the 
same industry if local market concentration decreases or when banks in the postal zone 




 specialization as competition intensifies as in {Boot, 2000 #315}.  But the effects seem 
rather modest, both in statistical significance and economic relevance.  Less industry 
specialization is also being observed when firms are located closer to the bank.  In that 
case, industry specialization may become less prevalent because borrowers are less 
discriminate about their choice of bank branch. 
B. Robustness Checks and Control Variables 
In Model V we again restrict the sample to the 9,213 firms that are both Single-Person 
Businesses (SPB) and Sole Proprietorships (SP).  However, we continue to assume that 
Industry Specialization is based on the entire loan portfolio of the branch.  As expected, 
results are statistically somewhat more significant and economically relevant.  Next we add 
Age in Model VI and other Firm Characteristics in Model VII.  Now all coefficients on the 
Competition variables become insignificant confirming our earlier assessments of relatively 
weak statistical significance.  
In {Boot, 2000 #315} competition affects bank industry specialization only for relationship 
borrowers.  We run all models on the set of borrowers we identified as relationship 
borrowers, (i.e., Relationship Banking = 1).  We first assume, as in {Boot, 2000 #315}, that 
industry specialization should be measured only for the portfolio containing these 
relationship borrowers.  Appendix Table A5 contains the results.  Most coefficients are 
similar in sign and size, but somewhat less statistically significant.  Next we measure 
industry specialization for the entire loan portfolio of the branch (assuming some positive 
knowledge spillovers from transactional lending) and re-run all seven models for the same 
sets of relationship borrowers as in Table A5.  Results are virtually unaffected and we 
choose not to tabulate them. 
Next we are concerned about overweighing industry specialization by large branches (by 
definition many borrowers belong to those industries that large branches specialize in).  We 
weigh all observations by the inverse of the number in each industry – branch group.  None 
of the coefficients on the competition variables are statistically significant or economically 
relevant any longer indicating that in particular large branches adjust their degree of 
specialization in their focused industries to competition.  This interpretation may also 
explain the percentage-wise small adjustments we pick up. 
Finally, we discuss the control variables.  The coefficient on Branch Size is always 
negative, significant, and economically relevant in Table 6.  Increasing Branch Size from 
the smallest to the largest branch decreases Industry Specialization by around 6.5% to 
12.5%.  The other control variables are hardly statistically significant (see Table A4) 
VI. Conclusion 
Competition seemingly affects bank orientation and industry specialization.  More 
competition results (in most cases) in more relationship banking and somewhat less bank 
industry specialization.  Borrowers located closer to the bank branch are more likely to 
consume other bank services and to be engaged over a longer time period.  In addition, 
closer-by borrowers are less likely to operate in an industry in which the branch specializes.  
Finally, larger bank branches lend substantially more on a transactional basis but are less 
likely to be specialized in particular industries. 
Taken at face value these results cannot reject hypotheses proposed by {Boot, 2000 #315}, 
among others, and partly match preliminary empirical work by {Elsas, 2003 #865}.  
However the results seem at odds with insights and results by {Petersen, 1995 #159}, 
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FIGURE 2.  EMPIRICAL FINDINGS ON COMPETITION AND BANK ORIENTATION 
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   TABLE 1.  DATA DESCRIPTION 
# Obs is the number of observations.  
a The definition used by the bank to determine whether it is the main bank is: for Single-Person Businesses and Small Firms, have a 
“turnover” on the current account of at least BEF 100,000 per month and buy at least two products from that bank.  
b We set HHI = 1 and (Number of Banks)
-1 = 1 if the 
Number of Branches = 0.  
c 40 Belgian Francs (BEF) are approximately equal to 1 Euro.  
d The dummies for Single-Person Businesses and Sole Proprietorships are 
suppressed in the regressions, hence not included in the Table. 
Variables  Definition  # Obs  Mean  Min Max  St.de
v 
Relations =
relationship with the borrower exceeds one year, in percent  
= 1 if bank considers itself as main bank,
a in percent 
 
 
elationship  Length of relationship with current lender, in years  13,098 7.8 5.5 0 26.3 
Industry Specialization  Proportion of branch loan portfolio in industry of b 13,098 8.2 3.9 6 100 
  ln(1 + Duration of Relationship) 13,098 1.9 0.8 0.0 3.3 
 
Number of  
f Adjacent Branches  Number of bank branches in borrower’s and adjacen 13,098 70.9 47.1 0 471 
Number of Banks  Number of banks in borrower’s postal zone  13,098 8.3 4.8 0 37 
HHI  Herfindahl – Hirschman Index, i.e. the sum
shares by number of branches in borrower’s postal zone
 
Sum of the bank pairs in borrower’s postal zone weighted by
13,098 0.205 0.194 1
b 
frequency of their bilateral contacts in other postal zones (see Appendix). 
Shortest traveling time, in minutes 
petitors  Shortest traveling time to closest quartile com
zone, in minutes 
11,222 3.7 2.3 0 24 
(1 + Number of Branches)
-1 
  ber of Adjacent Branches)
-1  13,098 0.047 0.175 0.001 1 
  (Number of Banks)
-1  13,098 0.183 0.199 0.027
b 
HHI
2  13,098 0.079 0.214 0.003 1 
Dependent Variables          
hip Banking   1 if bank considers itself as main bank
a and the length of the  13,098 52.4 49.9 0 100
Main Bank  13,098 54.3 49.8 0 100 
Duration of R
orrower, in percent   1 1 0.
Competition Variables   
 Branches  Number of bank branches in borrower’s postal zone  13,098 16.4 15.6 0 103
Number o t postal zones 
med squares of bank market  0.057
Multi-Market Contact   the relative  13,098 0.174 0.080 0 0.335 
Distance to Lender  11,222 6.7 7.2 0 51 
Distance to Closest Com petitor in borrower’s postal 
  Transformed Competition Variables  





  (1 + Distance to Len







-1  11,222 0.223 0.151 0.019 1 
   to Closest Competitors)
-1  11,222 0.734 0.148 0 0 
  HHI – (Number of Banks)
-1  13,098 0.021 0.023 0 0.875 
  (Number of Banks)
-2  13,098 0.073 0.214 0 1
b 
0.7   HI – (Number of Banks)
-1  ]
2  13,098 0.001 0.010 0 65 
   [ HHI – (Number of Banks)
-1  ] 13,098 0.002 0.004 0 0.140 
 
Branch P  
  Including 8 Postal Area Dummies   
Number of Firms  borrower’s postal zone, in thousands 13,098 0.749 0.891 0.002
Industry
Firm Dummies
Number of registered firms in the  6.103 
Assets of Firms  Average amount of assets of registered firms in the borrower’s postal 
zone, in billions of BEF
c 
Proportion of registered
13,098 0.068 0.131 0.000 3.739 
 Concentration   firms in borrower’s postal zone in industry of 
borrower, in percent  
= 1 if located in agglomeration > 250,000 inhabitants, in percent  
13,098 1.9 3.4 0 66.6 
Urban  13,098 9.9 29.8 0 100 
Including 49 Industry Dummies   
= 1 if < 10 employees and turno  
Large Firm  = 1 if > 10 employees or turnover > 250 million BEF,
c in percent   13,098 1.2
1
11.1 0 100 
Limited Partnership 
Limite
= 1 if firm is limited partnership, in percent  
haring, in percent  
13,098 2.1 32.6 0 100 
d Partnership w/ ES  = 1 if firm is limited partnership with equal s 13,098 1.0. 10.3 0 100 
Corporation  = 1 if firm is corporation, in percent   13,098 3.9 19.4 0 100 
rrangement  = 1 if firm is a temporary arrangemen 13,098 0.9 9.5 0 100 
Firm Characteristics    
Age in  years  1,991 16.4 24.3 0 96.2 
As s of BEF
c  0 0 0.00 0




  in billion 645 .014 .049 0 .878 
Assets
  in percent   645 0.117 0.148 0.528 1.252 
erm Debt / Assets
  in percent   645 0.406 0.216 0.001 0.957 
   
  
 Size  roportion of bank loan portfolio at the bank branch, in percent   13,098 0.249 0.152 0.006 0.905
Postal Zone Variables
d 
Small Firm  ver < 250 million BEF,
c  in percent   13,098 16.0 36.7 0 100
Medium and 




 TABLE 2.  SAMPLES’ CHARACTERISTICS 
Sample All Distance  SPB & SP Age Augmented 
Number of Observations  13,098 11,222  9,213 1,991 645 
Number of Postal Zones  922 737  717 509 309 
    
  
Average Relationship Banking, in %  52.4 53.0  51.4 60.5 65.7 





TABLE 3.  CORRELATION TABLE 
The number of observations is 13,098 in the area (1) – (6) and 11,222 elsewhere.  *, **, and *** = significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, using Pearson-correlation. 
    (2)  (3)            (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9)
   
Relationship Banking  (1)  0.963***  0.361***           
           
       
           
             
         
       
         
        
          
0.041*** -0.010 -0.003  0.003 0.034*** 0.008
Main Bank  (2)  1  0.291*** 0.043*** -0.007 -0.001  0.003 0.027*** 0.009
ln(Duration of Relationship)  (3)    1 -0.020**  -0.030***  -0.023***  0.028*** 0.098*** 0.014
Industry Specialization  (4)    1 0.016* 0.011  -0.006 -0.026*** 0.023**
HHI (5)   1 0.980***  -0.286*** -0.180*** -0.046***
HHI
2  (6)    1  -0.420*** -0.149*** -0.017*
Multi-Market Contact  (7)      1 -0.045***  -0.153***
(1+Distance to Lender)
-1  (8)      1 -0.281***
1–(1+Distance to Closest Competitors)
-1  (9)      1
   
          
 TABLE 4.  BANK ORIENTATION 
The dependent variable is Relationship Banking.  The definition of the variables can be found in Table 1.  The table reports the partial derivatives at the means, in percent , 
from binary Probit models.   *, **, and *** = significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, two-tailed.  SPB & SP: Single-Person Businesses and Sole Proprietorships.  The 
Pseudo R
 squared is calculated as in {Zavoina, 1975 #988}. 
Models I      II III IV        V VI VII
Samples  All      All All Distance  SPB & SP  Age  Augmented 
Number of Observations  13,098  13,098  13,098  11,222        9,213 1,991 645
Competition Variables 
HHI 3.1 -23.1* -44.8*** -56.0***       
     
-64.3*** -52.8 -118.1*
HHI
2  23.8** 46.0*** 64.1***        67.4*** 72.2* 158.7**
Multi-Market Contact     17.5*  28.0***       
   
26.4** 47.4** 112.8***
(1+Distance to Lender)
-1  11.3***       
   
12.6*** 11.9 33.0**
1 – (1 + Distance to Closest Competitors)
-1  3.8        2.6 12.1 8.3
Bank Branch Characteristic 
Branch  Size -14.3*** -14.9*** -14.3*** -13.7***       
   
-11.7*** -27.7*** -11.4
 
Postal Zone Variables and Constant  #  #  #  #        # # #
Firm Size and Legal Form Dummies
  #      # # #     
Industry Dummies #      # # #        #
Age    #
Firm Characteristics       #
Pseudo R
 squared 0.406  0.406  0.406  0.406       
   
0.404 0.392 0.404
       
     
       
     
    
    
       
           
 
    
 TABLE 5.  BANK ORIENTATION AND COORDINATION 
The dependent variable is Relationship Banking.  The definition of the variables can be found in Table 1.  
The table reports the partial derivatives at the means, in percent , from binary Probit models.   *, **, and 
*** = significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, two-tailed.  SPB & SP: Single-Person Businesses and Sole 
Proprietorships.  The Pseudo R







Samples  Distance  Distance 
Number of Observations  11,222  11,222 
Competition Variables     
(Number of Banks)
-1  -66.4***   
HHI – (Number of Banks)
-1  -21.7   
(Number of Banks)
-2  75.5***   
[ HHI – (Number of Banks)
-1 ]
2  286.9   
(Number of Banks)
-1 [ HHI – (Number of Banks)
-1 ] 11.1   
HHI   -53.5 
HHI
2   62.2* 
Multi-Market Contact 35.9***  13.4 
HHI * Multi-Market Contact
    118.3 
HHI
2 *
 Multi-Market Contact   -224.1 
(1+Distance to Lender)
-1  11.2***  11.4*** 
1 – (1 + Distance to Closest Competitors)
-1  3.2  3.9 
Bank Branch Characteristic     
Branch Size -13.6***  -13.6*** 
     
Postal Zone Variables and Constant  #  # 
Firm Size and Legal Form Dummies
  #  # 
Industry Dummies  #  # 
     
Pseudo R
 squared  0.406  0.406 
   
 TABLE 6.  BANK INDUSTRY SPECIALIZATION 
The dependent variable is Industry Specialization.  The definition of the variables can be found in Table 1.  The table reports the coefficients from ordinary least squares 
models.   *, **, and *** = significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, two-tailed.  SPB & SP: Single-Person Businesses and Sole Proprietorships. 
Models I      II III IV        V VI VII
Samples  All      All All Distance  SPB & SP  Age  Augmented 
Number of Observations  13,098  13,098  13,098  11,222        9,213 1,991 645
Competition Variables 
HHI 0.2 -1.6 7.4** 7.3*       
     
9.4** 5.0 -0.5
HHI
2  1.7 -7.5** -6.4        -8.1* -0.8 3.8
Multi-Market Contact     -9.0***  -5.0**       
   
-6.4** 2.2 7.0
(1+Distance to Lender)
-1  -1.4*       
   
-1.5* -1.6 -4.9
1 – (1 + Distance to Closest Competitors)
-1  1.1        1.1 1.2 -0.0
Bank Branch Characteristic 
Branch Size -8.7***  -8.7***  -14.0***  -8.1***       
   
-7.2*** -10.3*** -10.5***
 
Postal Zone Variables and Constant  #      # # #        # # #
Firm Size and Legal Form Dummies
  #      # # #     
Industry Dummies #      # # #        #
Age    #
Firm Characteristics       #
Adjusted R squared  0.385  0.385  0.385  0.397       
   
0.386 0.026 0.038
       
     
       
    
    
       
           
    
 TABLE A1.  BANK ORIENTATION: MAIN BANK 
The dependent variable is Main Bank.  The definition of the variables can be found in Table 1.  The table reports the partial derivatives at the means, in percent , from 
binary Probit models.   *, **, and *** = significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, two-tailed.  SPB & SP: Single-Person Businesses and Sole Proprietorships.  The Pseudo R
 
squared is calculated as in {Zavoina, 1975 #988}. 
Models I      II III IV        V VI VII
Samples  All      All All Distance  SPB & SP  Age  Augmented 
Number of Observations  13,098  13,098  13,098  11,222        9,213 1,991 645
Competition Variables 
HHI 4.0 -18.9 -45.5*** -58.4***       
     
-65.0*** -66.4* -134.4**
HHI
2  20.9* 48.1*** 68.6***        70.0*** 86.6** 170.4***
Multi-Market Contact     21.4**  34.0***       
   
30.1*** 58.8*** 114.1***
(1+Distance to Lender)
-1  9.6***       
   
10.3*** 12.5 32.0**
1 – (1 + Distance to Closest Competitors)
-1  3.9        2.9 10.4 8.6
Bank Branch Characteristic 
Branch  Size -13.8*** -14.3*** -13.6*** -14.2***       
   
-11.7*** -29.2*** -7.9
 
Postal Zone Variables and Constant  #      # # #        # # #
Firm Size and Legal Form Dummies
  #      # # #     
Industry Dummies #      # # #        #
Age    #
Firm Characteristics       #
Pseudo R
 squared
  0.408 0.408 0.408 0.409       
   
0.403 0.386 0.400
       
     
       
     
    
    
       
           
     
    
 TABLE A2.  BANK ORIENTATION: DURATION OF RELATIONSHIP 
The dependent variable is ln(Duration of Relationship).  The definition of the variables can be found in Table 1.  The table reports the partial derivatives at the means from 
Tobit models.   *, **, and *** = significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, two-tailed.  SPB & SP: Single-Person Businesses and Sole Proprietorships. 
Models I      II III IV        V VI VII
Samples  All      All All Distance  SPB & SP  Age  Augmented 
Number of Observations  13,098  13,098  13,098  11,222        9,213 1,991 645
Competition Variables 
HHI -0.0 -0.6*** -1.2*** -1.0***       
     
-1.2*** -0.6 -1.6*
HHI
2  0.6*** 1.1*** 0.9***        1.1*** 0.7 1.9**
Multi-Market Contact     0.4***  0.6***       
   
0.7*** 0.7** 1.6***
(1+Distance to Lender)
-1  0.4***       
   
0.4*** 0.5*** 0.9***
1 – (1 + Distance to Closest Competitors)
-1  0.1***        1.7*** 0.2* 0.2
Bank Branch Characteristic 
Branch  Size -0.4*** -0.4*** -0.4*** -0.3***       
   
-0.4*** -0.1 -0.1
 
Postal Zone Variables and Constant  #      # # #        # # #
Firm Size and Legal Form Dummies
  #      # # #     
Industry Dummies #      # # #        #
Age    #
Firm Characteristics       #
Adjusted R squared (of equivalent OLS)  0.101  0.102  0.103  0.105       
   
0.041 0.051 0.050
       
     
       
     
    
    
       
           
    
 TABLE A3.  BRANCH LOAN VOLUME 
The dependent variable is Only Lender, Relationship Banking, or ln(1 + Duration of Relationship).  
Ln(Bank Asset Size) is the log of bank assets, in 1000s of US$.  Ln(Branch Loan Volume) equals the 
natural logarithm of the loan portfolio of the branch, in 1000s of US$.  The definition of the other 
variables can be found in Table 1.  The table reports the coefficients from binary Logit and OLS models.   
*, **, and *** = significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, two-tailed.  BMPRS: {Berger, 2002 #677}; SPB & 
SP: Single-Person Businesses and Sole Proprietorships.  Goodness-of-fit measures: 
a Adjusted R squared, 
p Pseudo R squared, for IV as in {Zavoina, 1975 #988}. 
Models
BMPRS 
Table 6  IV  BMPRS 
Table 5  IV 






Model Estimation  Logit/IV  Logit IV OLS 
Samples    SPB & SP    SPB & SP 
Number of Observations  1,131  11,222 1,131 11,222 
Competition Variables       
HHI -0.242  -2.263*** 0.408* -1.076*** 
HHI
2    2.597***  1.021*** 
Multi-Market Contact   1.236***  0.626*** 
(1+Distance to Lender)
-1    0.497***  0.410*** 
1–(1 + Distance to Closest Competitors)
-1    0.162   0.166*** 
Bank Branch Characteristic       
ln(Bank Asset Size) -0.526***   -0.150***  
ln(Branch Loan Volume)   -0.037   -0.070*** 
Postal Zone Variables and Constant    #  # 
Firm Size and Legal Form Dummies
       
Industry Dummies   #  # 
Age      
Other variables in BMPRS  #   #  
      





     
 TABLE A4.  CONTROL VARIABLES 
The dependent variable is Relationship Banking (RB) or Industry Specialization (IS).  The definition of the variables can be found in Table 1.  The table reports the partial 
derivatives at the means, in percent , from binary Probit models (RB), or the coefficients from ordinary least squares models (IS).   *, **, and *** = significant at 10%, 5% 
and 1% level, two-tailed.  SPB & SP: Single-Person Businesses and Sole Proprietorships. 
Models IV      VI VII IV      VI VII
Dependent Variable  RB      RB RB IS      IS IS
Samples  Distance      Age Augmented Distance      Age Augmented
Number of Observations  11,222      1,991 645 11,222      1,991 645
Competition Variables  #      # # #      # #
Bank Branch Characteristic  #      # # #      # #
Postal Area Dummies and Constant  #      # # #      # #
Industry Dummies  #    #    
 
Number of Firms 1.1      -0.0 5.7** 0.1      -0.3 -0.8
Industry Concentration -32.7      80.6** -12.3 -6.1      31.6*** 58.1***
Assets of Firms -3.0      -8.2 6.0 -0.0      1.2 2.0
Urban 1.1      10.0** 26.6 2.0***      3.7*** 7.8***
 
Small Firm -8.0    0.2    
Medium and Large Firm -7.0    0.2    
Limited Partnership 16.1***     -0.2    
Limited Partnership w/ ES 23.0***     -1.2    
Corporation 17.2***     -0.6    
Temporary Arrangement 12.5*     -0.1    
 
Age -0.0 -0.1* -0.2* -0.0
Assets -27.8 -7.5
Earnings / Assets 31.2** -2.0
Short-Term Debt / Assets -12.9 1.2
 
      
      
      
           
         
         
         
      
 TABLE A5.  BANK INDUSTRY SPECIALIZATION: RELATIONSHIP LOANS 
The dependent variable is Industry Specialization (in the set of Relationship Loans only).  The definition of the variables can be found in Table 1.  The table reports the 
coefficients from ordinary least squares models.   *, **, and *** = significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, two-tailed.  SPB & SP: Single-Person Businesses and Sole 
Proprietorships. 
Models I      II III IV        V VI VII
Samples  All      All All Distance  SPB & SP  Age  Augmented 
Number of Observations  6,874  6,874  6,874  5,953        4,738 1,206 424
Competition Variables 
HHI 1.7 -0.4 17.8 7.4       
     
13.1 2.4 2.8
HHI
2  1.1 -16.6 -5.2        -11.3 6.4 0.5
Multi-Market Contact     -13.8**  -7.4       
   
-10.6** -1.3 5.7
(1+Distance to Lender)
-1  -4.8***       
   
-3.8** -9.9** -7.5
1 – (1 + Distance to Closest Competitors)
-1  1.8        1.6 3.8 2.2
Bank Branch Characteristic 
Branch  Size -17.8*** -17.8*** -18.1*** -22.4***       
   
-20.0*** -24.7*** -18.2***
 
Postal Zone Variables and Constant  #      # # #        # # #
Firm Size and Legal Form Dummies
  #      # # #     
Industry Dummies #      # # #        #
Age    #
Firm Characteristics       #
Adjusted R squared  0.616  0.616  0.617  0.303       
   
0.285 0.040 0.030
       
     
       
     
    
    
       
           




1 Arguments concerning the incompatibility between relationship-specific investments and 
competition are also fielded in other areas in economics.  For example, employers will be reluctant 
to invest in training when other employers can easily poach the trained workers in the future 
({Becker, 1975 #982}).  More in general, Schumpeter argued that a monopoly offers better 
incentives for innovation, as the monopolist-innovator is able to recoup its sunk R&D expenditures 
through the generation of future rents. 
2 See {Sabani, 1993 #992} for an early critical discussion of this point and also {Schnitzer, 1999 
#995}.  In {Chan, 1986 #994} bank competition undermines the reusability of screening 
information, bank rents, and the quality of bank assets, but does not reduce the availability of credit.  
In {Caminal, 2002 #996} bank market power has an ambiguous impact on bank failure rates.  See 
also the application in {Park, 2003 #997}. 
3 Market power is exogenous in {Petersen, 1995 #159} and the crucial information asymmetry is 
between borrowing firms and banks.  Firms initially know their own quality, but banks do not.  
Banks learn the borrowers’ type over time.  In contrast {Fischer, 1990 #548}, {Rajan, 1992 #163}, 
{Sharpe, 1990 #175}, and {von Thadden, 2001 #462} highlight the information asymmetry 
between banks to model endogenous informational monopoly power.  By lending repeatedly 
“inside” banks gather proprietary repayment information.  The resulting informational advantage 
vis-à-vis “outside” competing banks leads to some degree of monopoly power over the borrowing 
firms.  Two points are worth noting.  First, bank relationships arise endogenously in these models, 
even in perfectly competitive banking markets (as a fraction of the firms decides to stay with the 
current bank).  Second, “learning by lending” does not require relationship specific investments.  
We will discuss a model with relationship specific investments at the end of this section. 
In {Dell'Ariccia, 2001 #516} banks combine market power from product differentiation 
(exogenous) with informational monopoly power (endogenous).  The contours of the informational 
asymmetry per se determine both the choice of banking type and the resulting market structure.  
Abatement in the informational problem in his model may lead to more banks operating in the 
market and more transactional banking, resulting in a similar correspondence (though not causality) 
between market structure and banking choice as in {Petersen, 1995 #159}.  More product 
differentiation on the other hand leads, for a given number of banks, to more price discrimination in 
the second period and higher loan rates in the first period. 
4 Fiercer interbank competition also results in more relationship lending in {Banerjee, 2002 #875}, 
{Schmeits, 2002 #876}, {Dell'Ariccia, 2003 #868}, and {Hauswald, 2003 #706}.  Similarly, more 
competition fosters renegotiation of contracts in {Berlin, 2002 #910}. 
5 See also {Anand, 2000 #694} and {Anand, 2002 #867}. 
6 Recent papers also investigate how changes in technology or bank regulation affect bank 
specialization and competition: for example {Bouckaert, 1995 #852}, {Degryse, 1996 #665}, 
{Schargrodsky, 2000 #874}, {Stomper, 2001 #618}, and {Hauswald, 2002 #736}. 
7 Closest in spirit to Petersen and Rajan’s study is the paper by {Zarutskie, 2003 #882}.  She 
employs a dataset containing almost 200,000 small firm – year observations.  She finds that the 
probability of small firms utilizing bank debt increases when the concentration (in local deposit 
markets) is high.  Similarly {Bergstresser, 2001 #911} finds that in more concentrated markets there 
are fewer constrained consumer-borrowers, while {Bergstresser, 2001 #912} documents that in 
more concentrated markets banks raise the average share of assets lent.  {Scott, 2001 #913} find 
that more competition not only increases the availability of credit but also decreases the loan rate 
and improves service performance (including knowledge of business, industry, provision of advice, 
etc.) by banks. 
8 {Cetorelli, 2001 #525}, {Cetorelli, 2002 #999}, {Cetorelli, 2003 #998}, and {Cetorelli, 2003 
#1000} also find that banking market power may represent a financial barrier to entry in product 
markets.  However {Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2003 #1001} find opposite results for Italy. 
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10 549 bank branches lend to firms located in 921 out of 1,168 postal zones.  The concentration 
index of the number of loans (sum of shares squared) is 22 (equal shares would yield an index equal 
to 9).   
11 NACE is the European industrial classification system subdividing industries.  The industry 
concentration index across the 50 industries is around 1,200 (equal shares would result in an index 
equal to 200). 
12 We use Belgian Francs (BEF) throughout the paper but indicate equivalent amounts in Euros.  
Belgium switched to the Euro on January 1
st, 1999. 
13 Banks may obtain an important informational advantage from observing checking accounts 
({Nakamura, 1993 #150}, {Vale, 1993 #198}, {Mester, 2002 #506}). 
14 The Annual Report of the Belgian Bankers Association reports 7,668 branches.  We consolidate 
multiple branches of the same bank at the same address. 
15 Belgium covers 30,230 sq km in land surface (source: CIA Factbook 1995). 
16 See for example {Hannan, 1991 #559} and {Sapienza, 2002 #450}. 
17 An incorrect a priori choice of the relevant geographical market cuts against finding significant 
results for the simple reason that with inappropriate market delineation we expect the resulting 
“markets” not to be relevant in determining competitive conditions. 
18 For details see {Degryse, 2003 #827}.  {Buch, 2002 #629} and {Corvoisier, 2001 #668} finds 
similar evidence for other European countries.  This evidence contrasts with studies showing that 
U.S. bank branch – borrower distance has grown substantially ({Cyrnak, 2001 #669}; {Petersen, 
2002 #632}). 
19 U.S. bank concentration studies always use deposit market shares.  However, {Fischer, 2001 
#989} also employs branch market shares for Germany and shows that for U.S. Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas the “branch HHI” is highly correlated with the “deposit HHI”. 
20 {Pilloff, 1999 #993} finds a positive but economically small effect of multi-market contact on 
U.S. bank profitability, except for a group of large banks for which the effect becomes somewhat 
meaningful. 
21 We consolidate the branches in 104 banks (sometimes banks comprise distinctly incorporated sets 
of branches in Brussels, Flanders, and Wallonia).  There are 837 postal zones with bank branches.  
Let Dij = 1 if bank i operates in postal zone j, and = 0 otherwise, for i = 1, …, 104; j = 1, …, 837.  
Let  , and fj: the number of different banks offering service in postal zone j.  The 
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MMC . 
22 We actually employ the distance to the quartile closest competitor.  The quartile closest 
competitor is the bank branch with the 25-percentile traveling time located in the same postal zone 
as the borrower.  We select this measure to gauge competitor proximity for obvious measurement 
reasons.  Omissions and recording or mapping errors are less likely to influence the 25-percentile 
statistic than the shortest distance statistic.  In addition, bank branches may not be entirely 
homogeneous in their product offerings.  In that case, we also conjecture that our 25% measure is 
more highly correlated with the distance to the closest, “truly” competing bank branch than the 
minimum distance metric. 
23 Antwerpen, Brussel – Schaarbeek, Charleroi, Gent, and Liege (source: UN Demographic 
Yearbook 1995).  We assign postal zones on the basis of the current circumscription. 
24 It may be more profitable for banks to reserve relationship lending for loans of larger size 
({Stanton, 2002 #991}) and for large firms. 
25 We also employ a Logit model throughout, but given the mean of the dependent variable is close 
to 50%, not surprisingly results are unaffected. 
26 The U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines 







27 The local markets in his paper are also substantially larger than in ours.  The average postal zone 
in Belgium contains less than 10,000 inhabitants, while the mean Landkreise in Germany counts 
around 175,000 people. 
28 The average firm in {Elsas, 2003 #865} has an annual turnover of approximately 4,000 million 
BEF, while the average firm in our Augmented sample reports 14 million BEF in total assets. 
29 German and Belgian corporations seem to maintain a similar number of bank relationships 
({Ongena, 2000 #376}), but small firms in general are found to have fewer bank relationships (the 
empirical evidence is reviewed in {Ongena, 2000 #460}).  The average small Belgian firm surveyed 
by {de Bodt, 2001 #739} employs two banks.  The firms in the latter sample are on average more 
than three times larger and 7 years older than the firms in our sample. 
30 A Hausman test cannot reject at a 1-% level that random effects should be favored.  
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